Reports of "miracle babies" such as the McCaughey septuplets, 1 the intact survival of a 360-gm girl born at 26 and 1/7 weeks' gestation, 2 or the even more startling news of a 280-gm twin girl born at 26 and 6/7 weeks' gestation who is now in grade school and developing normally 3 have led to the expectation that medicine can rescue almost every neonate beyond 22 weeks' gestation. Confirmation of this belief is found in a recent essay in the Journal of Perinatology by Sanders et al., 4 who note that 82% of neonatologists surveyed would ventilate an infant born at 23 weeks' gestation. That number increases to 95% for infants delivered at 24 weeks' gestation. For the respondents in the Sanders survey, any prediction of Ͻ100% mortality justifies an attempt at resuscitation. These data on the willingness of physicians to attempt resuscitation on infants at the very margins of viability are confirmed in other multiple studies done over the past decade. 3, 5, 6 The deciding factor in these cases is not physician assessment of potential for survival, but rather parental request for resuscitation. This is true, for example, in the study by Doran et al.
Ethical Issues
cantly worsened and the attending physician, after additional discussions with the parents, limited any increase in the level of ventilatory and other support. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation would not be provided in the event of severe bradycardia or asystole. Morphine infusions were continued to provide pain relief and comfort. The infants developed severe bradycardia. Twin A died on day of life 20. Twin B died on day of life 22.
DISCUSSION
Although the data in the literature indicate that the potential for survival of twins at these extremely low birth weights is very poor, the 280-gm twin girl born at 26 and 6/7 weeks' gestation who is now in grade school and developing normally is proof positive that it is not zero. There is, consequently, a basis for following the parents' request that "everything possible" be done for their infants. But as Muraskas et al., 2 who successfully brought that 280-gm patient through 122 days of hospitalization, note, their success "supports case-specific management [of a single patient] with severe IUGR." It does not signal a decided shift in outcome for very low birth weight infants. In fact, they report that their data on 169 infants of Յ600 gm admitted to their neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) at Loyola Chicago Medical Center (Chicago, IL) from 1985 to 1996 "reflects the national trend of neonatal care units" on survivability and morbidity.
Those trends are seen in the reported outcomes from several large neonatal centers and in a major geographical analysis of outcome data. 3, 6, 9 -13 The findings of these studies are consistent: although there is now some survival of preterm infants at the lower levels of weight (Ͻ600 gm) and age (Ͻ24 weeks' gestation), the prospect for survival and, more importantly, intact survival is exceedingly small. For example, a 1993 study by Allen et al. 3 reveals that for infants born at 22 to 25 weeks' gestation at Johns Hopkins (Baltimore, MD), none of the 29 infants born at 22 weeks' gestation survived, 15% survived at 23 weeks' gestation, and 56% survived at 24 weeks' gestation. Of those born at 23 weeks' gestation, only 2% survived without severe abnormalities on cranial ultrasound.
When weight rather than age is used as the determinant of the lower margins of viability, similar bleak outcomes are found. Hack et al. report that in their study of outcomes of extremely low birth weight infants at Cleveland's Rainbow Babies Hospital (Cleveland, OH), "only 8 of 159 infants of Ͻ500 gm birth weight received active delivery room treatment during the whole 9-year period, of whom 2 survived." 6 In a 12-year historical cohort study of 1193 infants of Ͻ500 gm born between 1983 and 1994 in Alberta, Canada, Sauve et al. 14 report that of the 382 born alive, neonatal care was provided in 113 cases (29.6%). Of those, 95 (84.1%) died and 18 (15.9%) were discharged alive, 5 of whom subsequently died of respiratory complications. Of the 13 (11%) survivors, 4 had no serious disabilities. The remaining nine had one or more major disabilities including cerebral palsy, profound mental retardation, blindness, and deafness.
Given consistent finds of an 85 to 90% in-hospital mortality and a mere 2 to 3.5% intact survival for infants at the margins of viability, a more nuanced ethical analysis than "the parents make the ultimate decision" is required. The first question to be asked should not be, "what do you want?" It should be, "what is going on?" Only with an assessment and understanding of what is happening can we determine, in Niebuhr's words, "what the appropriate response is." 15 What was happening in the case of the H twins? At delivery, the neonatologist was confronted with a nearly, but not quite, unprecedented situation. Because their age as well as their weight put these twins into a group within which there have been reported survivors, it was not unacceptable at a level III nursery to give these infants a chance. Resuscitate and see how they do. In doing so, however, it is imperative to keep focused on the fact that we are entering into what Hack and Fanaroff label "the experimental nature of current treatment." 16 For the first 10 days of life, the infants were stable. But on day of life 10, radiographic studies revealed a declining pulmonary status. When the infants' pulmonary status continued to fail despite every effort to ameliorate their condition, it became clear to the medical staff that the medical status of both infants was incompatible with survival.
Given that situation what should be done? Does the neonatologist simply heed the exhortation, "do whatever the parents want?" Does the treating physician mindlessly do "everything possible" to satisfy parental hopes, fears, or denial? For a physician to do so, as Ingelfinger pointedly reminds us in an essay on the patient-physician relationship, is to be "guilty of shirking [one's] duty, if not malpractice." 17 Ingelfinger's position on the positive role of the physician to intervene to protect the interests of the infant even over parental protests to the contrary is supported by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists' and the American Academy of Pediatrics' statement that in such situations, the role of parents is not absolute. 18, 19 Although their informed decision must be given great weight, the parents' decision is not dispositive. 20 The focal point for the neonatologist, as for every physician, is the best interests of the patient. That standard, as the American Academy of Pediatrics guidelines on foregoing life-sustaining medical treatment reminds us, must weigh the benefits and burdens of treatment from the infant's (not the parents') perspective. Such an assessment requires calculating the chance that the therapy will succeed and the degree to which it will extend life if successful; the risks, pain, and discomfort involved with the treatment or nontreatment; and the anticipated quality of life with or without the treatment. 21 Tyson et al., 22 whose research on viability and morbidity among 501-to 800-gm birth weight infants provides the best American data on these issues, hold that ventilation is not necessarily justified simply because it affords a modest chance of survival. They argue that although most immature infants will die without such an intervention, mechanical ventilation can make for worse outcomes: death after days or months of distress or morbidity so severe it might be considered worse than death. To avoid that outcome, they propose that medical interventions on extremely premature infants be judged for individual infants as mandatory, optional, investigational, or unreasonable. This classification allows for a more nuanced analysis of what is being done, and it broadens the decision-making process beyond just asking the parents, "what do you want?"
The categories are explained as follows:
Mandatory
If, as we have observed in an earlier article, 20 the parents ask the physician to withhold or withdraw a treatment that has a very high likelihood of significantly benefiting a child, the treating physician's independent obligation to foster the best interests of the patient prohibits following the parents' request. The physician is morally obliged to provide such treatment even over the family's protests. (The legal questions on the need for court involvement, protective custody, or guardianship are beyond the scope of the moral analysis we address here.) Optional When, as is true in the case of these twins, the risks are very high and the benefits are at best uncertain or extremely low, the parents have the option of accepting or rejecting the proposed resuscitation. In this "gray zone," the parents' decision either way should be honored and supported. 23 
Investigational
As Lantos et al. 24 commented in an insightful analysis of resuscitation in babies of very low birth weight, the outcome data available for some procedures are such that at best we can tell parents, "this intervention is so new or its effect on this class of patients so unproven that it is an 'innovative' or 'experimental' procedure." What both physician and parents have to understand at this point is that they are embarking into the realm of the unknown. We proceed in such situation on a hypothesis and hope. The latter may be dashed and the former discarded as we test the hypothesis and assess the results. This joint venture into the investigational requires a willingness on the part of both the physician and parents to assess and reassess at every step. If the hoped for effect is not achieved or if the evolving data indicate that there is no evidence that it can be attained, there is no basis for continuing the "investigation."
At the point at which the chosen treatment fails to check or reverse the patient's progressive deterioration, the justification for the initial intervention has ceased and, unless there is another overriding rationale for carrying on, there is no justification to continue the procedure. A "time-limited trial" is the hallmark of this investigational process. The endpoint of such a trial is twofold: The withdrawal of consent or the "failure" of the investigational intervention to reverse or affect the disease process.
Unreasonable
Once a procedure, drug, or process under investigation has failed to attain the desired goal, there is no justification to continue it. 25 As Moore has eloquently stated, "there must be a rationale on which the desperately ill patient may be offered not merely pain, suffering, and cost, but also a true hope of prolonged survival [without devastating sequelae]." 26 
Current Practice of Neonatologists in the Face of Failed Therapies?
What is the practice of neonatologists when confronted with a deteriorating patient receiving life-sustaining treatment? A study by Wall and Partridge 27 reveals that in the face of imminent death, most neonatologists recommend the withdrawal or withholding of treatment. Some centers, such as Chapel Hill, NC, report that "in most cases, death occurred after life-sustaining treatment was withdrawn." 7 A different perspective is taken by Meadow, 11 who reports that at the University of Chicago Children's Hospital (Chicago, IL), "the overwhelming majority of these patients are not withdrawn from the ventilation simply because the ethical consensus in our nursery is that if the patients are going to die anyway, and die soon, it is an unnecessary burden to ask parents to participate in a decision to withdraw care from their infant." "This practice," he notes, "reflects the fairly consistent beliefs of the parents in our patient population." The postulate of Meadow's position are data from his study indicating that 80% of extremely low birth weight deaths occurred in the first 3 days of life. From this, he argues not only "the reasonableness of physicians offering NICU care to extremely low birth weight infants with unlikely prospects for survival, but to the continuation of that support lest the physician 'unnecessarily burden the parents' by asking them to participate in a decision to withdraw ventilatory support form their infant."
In contrast to Meadow's position, Hack and Fanaroff 5 found that although aggressive treatment of infants with birth weights of Ͻ750 gm did not affect mortality, it did increase the mean age of death from 72 to 880 hours. Allen et al. 3 report a similar frequency of late deaths in their study at Johns Hopkins. This lead to their conclusion that "although an argument can be made in favor of keeping an infant alive long enough for the parents to say goodbye, deliberately prolonging death beyond a few hours is difficult to justify." For Allen et al., prolonging death is not relieving the parents of a burden, it is "prolonging suffering, not only for the infant, but also for the family and members of the staff."
Rationales for Continuing NICU Treatment for the Dying Infant
Although, as Wall and Partridge 27 observe, many neonatologists believe the application or continuation of intensive care may be at times either inappropriate or even inhumane, they nonetheless do it regularly. What rationale beyond the position of Wall and Partridge that "the infant's parents make the ultimate decision" drives this behavior? A common argument is the one made by Meadow that we ought not add to the parents' burden as they are trying to cope with the loss of a child by asking them to make a decision to limit or terminate interventions. Davis 13 observes that if this additional time in the NICU resulted in more opportunity for the parents to bond or to adjust to the death of their infant, it might well be justified. However, as she notes, "I know of no studies that support this argument, and it is possible that the days [or weeks] before death may increase rather than decrease parental suffering."
Another common theme is that "mom or dad need time to adapt to and accept the reality of their infant's dying." That is the argument offered by the neonatologist who resuscitated the anencephalic Baby K. 28 He resuscitated and put the infant on a ventilator, so that, he testified, the mother could come to accept the reality of an anencephalic child. When Baby K suffered a cardiac arrest some 2 years later, the mother was still insisting that the physicians do everything possible to save her child. Only after 45 minutes of unsuccessful cardiopulmonary resuscitation did those efforts cease. As the case of Baby K shows, additional time in and of itself for the parents to adjust to the reality of the infant's condition does not necessarily lead to acceptance.
Another frequently heard comment in the NICU is, "we are doing this more as psychotherapy for the parents." When, one might ask, did ventilators, extracorporeal membrane oxygenation, and NICUs enter the psychotherapeutic armamentarium? Aren't there less invasive ways to help parents cope? Furthermore, when did it become legitimate to use the suffering of others as a coping mechanism? Kant's categorical imperative still prevails: It is immoral to use one human being as a means rather than as an end in itself. 29 Appeals to the coping capacity of parents is not a justification for additional patient suffering, particularly when the patient is an infant.
Parents sometimes provide a different rationale for continuing past the point at which physicians have no reasonable expectation of reversal: they are waiting for a miracle. In part, medicine has itself to blame for this situation. Physicians themselves use the term all too often to describe a newly discovered treatment or procedure that has proven effective in reversing a previously intractable problem. 30 The widespread use of this term in medicine is seen in the 14,687 citations found since 1996 in a MEDLINE search of the term "medical miracle." This frequent usage leads to the belief that there is, in fact, a technological fix for every problem. All that is required is greater diligence in their search for a cure on the part of physicians.
At other times, parents use the term "miracle" in its theological context. Baby K's mother, for example, insisted on continued ventilatory support for Ͼ2 years because she believed that God was going to make her anencephalic daughter whole. 28 For her, every day of continued life was a new opportunity for God's intervention in the life of her child. The prayer for a miracle is, of course, an appropriate action by a parent who is told there is no effective medical treatment for the child's medical condition. But parents have come to the wrong place when they appeal to the physician to provide a true "miracle." Medicine's mission and mandate is more constrained; its powers are more limited.
A variation on the miracle approach is accusing the physician of "playing God" when he or she has determined that the medications or procedures used to check or reverse the dying process have failed to achieve that goal and should be withdrawn. This is not "playing God" but rather using the God-given gifts of reason and the understanding of science that leads the physician to that all too human judgment that this patient's condition is beyond the help of medicine. 31 Another rationale frequently invoked for continuing beyond the boundaries of medical judgment is fear of the law. Americans, as de Tocqueville 32 observed over a century and half ago, have a strange propensity to transform moral dilemmas into legal problems, as if somehow suing the opposing party will produce the desired result. There is no question physicians do not want to be sued and will, at times, act contrary to their judgment to avoid that prospect. Such action, however, is both bad law and bad medicine. Further, it has the effect of establishing a standard of care: "Physicians will do whatever you ask if you threaten to sue them."
Schneiderman and Manning documented that perverse outcome in a survey of the attitudes of neonatologists, emergency department physicians, and chairs of institutional ethics committees on providing ventilatory support for an anencephalic infant. 33 The respondents were unanimous that such treatment was wrong. In their words such action is "ridiculous," "insane," "outrageous," and "an example of what is wrong with medicine today." Yet when asked what they would do if, as was true in the case of Baby K, a parent requested such care, the majority of physicians polled (54 of 89) stated they would comply with the parent's wish. As Schneiderman and Manning concluded: "If providing Baby K with prolonged life-sustaining treatment falls within the professional standard of care, what possible exception can the physician claim as the basis for withholding any conceivable treatment short of death itself?"
The most common rationale presented for physician compliance with parental demands to continue medical support in these type of cases is "autonomy." With the shift in the last few decades away from physician paternalism toward full patient involvement in the decision-making process, the idea has arisen that not only does the competent patient have the right acknowledged in the Supreme Court's 1990 Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health 34 opinion to reject any and all unwanted medical interventions, but that the patient (or proxy) has the right to determine what treatments will be provided. This belief is particularly strong with regard to a procedure that can prolong if not prevent death. 35 
Guidelines on Innovative Procedures
Although imposing heroic suffering on one's self in the hope of a therapeutic benefit or even the altruistic advancement of science is acceptable, 36 the same does not hold for imposing that suffering on others. The lesson from the Willowbrook experiments, in which severely retarded children were subjected to hepatitis infection in the search for a cure, is that there are limits to which children may be subjected in clinical investigation. 37 The requirements for proceeding in such investigations are substantially higher than having parental consent. 38 The issue in research ethics is how to protect vulnerable populations, such as children who cannot protect themselves, from the injury that can occur as a result of investigational procedures. To guard their interests, we need to recast the issue in cases such as resuscitation of infants at the very margins of viability from "autonomy," which it is not, to the rules governing research subjects. In such cases, as Lantos 39 noted in an essay on that topic, "the effectiveness of therapy replaces patient preference as the primary factor governing decisions to use or discontinue therapy."
The importance of the distinction between requirements governing therapeutic and research interventions is reiterated in two recent New England Journal of Medicine articles on ethical aspects of randomized trials. In a study of the harm that can be done to patients in randomized trials, Capron 40 reminds us that "the lesson of the last half-century is that suffering, death, and violation of human rights can arise not only when dictators give inhumane scientists free reign to treat human beings as guinea pigs, but also when well-meaning physicians conduct research in a free and enlightened society." That reality leads Truog 41 to insist that unlike conventional therapy, investigational procedures require more than informed consent; they demand heightened protection of the subject by the investigator.
The insistence on increased scrutiny by the physician on behalf of the subject highlights the continuing significance of the Nuremberg Code's emphasis on the protection of research subjects. 42 As the Code makes clear, there are guidelines and norms for stopping research investigations on human subjects. First and foremost, the subject can at anytime opt out of the research. Furthermore, and most importantly for our analysis, the Code insists that "during the course of the experiment, the scientist in charge must be prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill, and careful judgment required of him, that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death of the experimental subject."
Although consent of the subject or proxy are a necessary prerequisite to begin an investigational procedure, they are not a sufficient basis to continue. The Code mandates that the scientist investigator exercise independent judgment on the safety and efficiency of the intervention under investigation. In particular, the scientist is charged with protecting the subject from "all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury."
That obligation continues to be the duty of neonatologists who use innovative or unproven methods to sustain life at the margins of viability. That neonatologists honor the obligation is seen in reports such as those of Allen et al. 3 at Johns Hopkins that if there is no positive response in the delivery room to bag-and-mask ventilation in infants with poor respiratory effort and low heart rate, no prolonged resuscitation is attempted. These physicians know from the literature and their extensive experience that additional efforts in such cases would at best only delay the inevitable outcome accompanied by painful and potentially harmful interventions. They do not engage in such action.
As the recent MacDonald v Milleville case shows, parental permission to stop the attempted resuscitation in such circumstances is not legally required. 43 The same holds true for those infants who, despite an initial positive response, develop a physical condition as incompatible with survival as that evidenced in a newborn whose heart rate cannot be increased beyond 40 to 50 beats per minute.
The problem in these cases is not one of science; every neonatologist knows that twins of 24 weeks' gestation and weighing 510 and 410 gm with progressively deteriorating pulmonary function cannot survive. The problem lies in the practice developed over the past two decades of giving parents the cruel decision to continue the now failed attempts at restoring health or let their child die. For many parents, the latter choice is too difficult even to contemplate. Overwhelmed by anguish, they are in no position to make a reasoned choice, let alone one that will dash forever their hopes for a healthy child.
When there is no realistic choice to be made or when one of the choices fails and thereby ceases to be an option, no choice should be offered. The words we use when undertaking an investigational procedure ("we will initiate the process and see how the child declares himself") should be followed. If, as happened in this case, both infants evidenced pulmonary insufficiency incompatible with survival, the parents should be informed that although "everything possible" has been tried, all efforts have failed. The most now we can do for the infants is to keep them comfortable.
There is no more requirement to ask parents' permission to end the investigational use of ventilation in such a case than to seek their authorization to cease Ambu-bagging after 10 minutes of failure to get a newborn's heart rate beyond 40 to 50 beats per minute. As Avery commented in a 1987 editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine on the care of extremely small infants, "do not continue with intensive care in the face of accumulating evidence of hopelessness." In blunt words, he exhorted his colleagues to "take a stand." 44 Had neonatologists heeded that challenge, we would not be entering the next millennium still pondering our obligations to infants for whom medicine's exquisite interventions have failed. It is still not too late to respond to that call.
